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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD S. TRUJILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20020023-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a consolidated appeal from convictions on one count 
each of attempted aggravated murder, a first degree felony, and 
burglary, evidence tampering, and receiving or transferring a 
stolen vehicle, all second degree felonies.1 This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-
3(2)(e) and (j)(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
consecutive sentences where it considered and weighed all the 
necessary statutory factors? 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
1
 In his jurisdictional statement, defendant asserts 
convictions on two counts of receiving or transferring a stolen 
vehicle (Br. of Aplt. at 1). In case no. 001906768, however, one 
count was dismissed as part of the plea agreement. See R. 1: 54-
60. 
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court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
"the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401, governing concurrent and 
consecutive sentences, provides: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the offenses.... 
. . . 
(4) A court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant in. determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (4) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with multiple offenses in three 
district court cases (R. 1: 2-7; R. 2: 4-5; R. 127: 3).2 In one 
2
 "R.l" refers to the red record volume in district court 
case 001906768FS; "R.2" refers to the analogous volume in case 
-2-
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case, he was charged with six felonies and one misdemeanor: two 
first degree felony counts of attempted aggravated murder and one 
of aggravated burglary; one count each of second-degree-felony 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle and tampering with 
evidence; one count of third-degree-felony failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop; and one count of class-B-misdemeanor 
theft (R. 1: 2-5). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he entered 
guilty pleas to one count of attempted aggravated murder, a first 
degree felony with a firearm enhancement, and one count each of 
burglary and evidence tampering, both second degree felonies (R. 
1: 65-66). In the second case, defendant pled guilty, as 
charged, to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, a second 
degree felony (R. 2 at 72-79). A third case, involving second 
and third degree felony charges of burglary and theft, was 
dismissed in its entirety as part of the plea agreement (R. 127: 
3-4) . 
The court conducted a single sentencing hearing. See R. 118 
or R. 128.3 After receiving a presentence investigation report 
and hearing from the victim, his father, his spouse, and two 
witnesses, the court ordered that defendant serve one term of six 
years to life and three terms of one to fifteen years in the Utah 
001900513FS. 
3
 R. 118 and R. 128 are identical transcripts of the 
sentencing hearing, held December 20, 2001. 
-3-
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State Prison (R. 1: 65-66; R. 2: 83-84). The court further 
ordered that the sentences run consecutively, both with each 
other and with the sentence defendant was already serving (R. 1: 
65-66; R. 2: 83-84; R. 118: 34, 36). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 1: 67-68). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Early one winter morning, defendant noticed a vehicle parked 
in a driveway, unattended, with the motor running (PSR at 3). He 
got into the vehicle and drove away. He was apprehended several 
days later after the owner spotted the vehicle parked in his 
neighborhood, adjacent to a nearby home where defendant's 
girlfriend was living (Id. at 2; R. 2: 5). The inside of the 
vehicle had been "trashed" (PSR at 2). Defendant told the 
presentence investigator, "I was using drugs, I took it to get 
around, to have a ride. No real purpose" (Id. at 3). 
Several months later, in a separate incident, an individual 
called the police early one morning to report an unfamiliar 
vehicle in a neighbor's driveway and a man suspiciously 
"checking" the house (Id. at 3; R. 1: 5). En route to the home 
to investigate a possible burglary in progress, the responding 
officers were informed by dispatch that the vehicle had been 
reported stolen (R. 1: 5). 
Two marked patrol cars arrived at the home just as defendant 
was backing the stolen vehicle out of the driveway (PSR at 3; R. 
-4-
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1: 4). When the uniformed officers activated their flasher 
lights, defendant fled, with the officers in pursuit (PSR at 3; 
R. 1: 4) . About a block away, defendant lost control of the 
vehicle and crashed into a parked car. The officers ordered 
defendant out of the vehicle at gunpoint. Defendant complied, 
but then pushed past both officers and fled on foot, throwing 
items from his pockets as he ran (R. 1: 4-5). A passerby, 
observing two police officers chasing defendant on foot, tackled 
defendant to the ground (PSR at 3; R. 1: 5). 
The two officers, Morgan in front and Dobrowolski just 
behind him, began struggling with defendant to gain control. 
Both men heard a "pop," and Officer Morgan realized he had been 
shot in the face (PSR at 3; R. 1: 5) .4 As Officer Dobrowolski 
continued to struggle for control, he saw defendant point a 
handgun at him and pull the trigger several times. The gun did 
not fire (R. 1: 5). Eventually, the officer wrestled the handgun 
away from defendant and subdued him (Id.). 
Close by, officers found personal papers, a checkbook, and 
two television remotes, all belonging to another nearby homeowner 
(R. 1: 6-7). Upon further investigation, officers observed pry 
marks on a garage window and rifled drawers throughout the home. 
The homeowner told police that a bank full of coins was missing; 
when the officers arrested defendant, he had in his possession "a 
4
 The officer eventually recovered (R. 118: 5-6). 
-5-
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large quantity of coins in his right front pants pocket" (R. 1: 
6) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The crux of defendant's argument is that the trial court, in 
ordering consecutive sentences, "unduly focuse[d] on the gravity 
of the circumstances and [defendant's] drug use without giving 
^adequate weight' to his character and rehabilitative potential." 
Br. of Aplt. at 10 (citation omitted). 
In conducting an appellate review, this Court gives 
deference to the trial court's advantaged position to make the 
individualistic assessment necessary for a proper sentencing. 
This Court also recognizes that, while the trial court must 
consider all statutory sentencing factors, it is not required to 
give each of them equal weight. And this Court will reverse a 
trial court's consecutive sentencing determination "only if it 
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
In this case, defendant demonstrated an extensive criminal 
history, beginning as a preteen, continuing into a drug-dependent 
adulthood, and culminating in the intentional shooting of a 
police officer and clear endangerment of the community. Where 
Adult Probation and Parole, after preparing a presentence 
investigation report, unequivocally declared that "consecutive 
sentences are demanded," the conclusion reached by the trial 
-6-
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court is objectively reasonable. Consequently, its decision 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE 
LIMITS OF ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
WHERE THE DRUG-DEPENDENT DEFENDANT 
DEMONSTRATED AN ESCALATING PATTERN 
OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, BEGINNING AT 
AGE 11 AND CULMINATING IN THE 
INTENTIONAL SHOOTING OF A POLICE 
OFFICER, AND WHERE ADULT PROBATION 
AND PAROLE UNEQUIVOCALLY 
RECOMMENDED CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering consecutive sentences without "giv[ing] ^adequate 
weight' to [his] good character and rehabilitative prospects" and 
instead focusing too heavily on the nature of his crime and his 
drug use. See Br. of Aplt. at 8 (citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930, 938 (Utah 1998)). 
At the outset, this Court should exercise restraint in 
reviewing the sentencing decision of the trial court. Trial 
courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters 
because they are in the best position to make the highly 
individualistic assessments required in sentencing decisions. 
See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (sentencing 
"necessarily reflects the pergonal judgment of the court") 
(citation omitted). In deciding the appropriateness of a 
particular sentence, the trial court considers many intangibles, 
-7-
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such as the defendant's "character, personality, and attitude, of 
which the cold record gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 
310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). A sentencing court's assessment 
of defendant's character and feelings of remorse may be based, at 
least in part, on the court's personal observation of defendant's 
body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are 
reflected in the record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
With these principles in mind, defendant's argument that the 
trial court did not adequately weigh the statutory sentencing 
factors ultimately fails because the sentencing statute, while 
making clear that the trial court must consider certain factors 
prior to imposing consecutive sentences, does not require the 
court to accord each of the factors equal weight. See, e.g., 
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-19 (Utah 1985)(recognizing 
that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to 
circumstances of crime); State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 
1979)(judge has discretion in determining weight given to 
sentencing recommendations contained in evaluation reports). The 
statute nowhere precludes a court, having considered all the 
circumstances, from determining that punishment should take 
precedence over rehabilitation. See State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) ("trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather 
-8-
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than rehabilitating him"). 
Defendant's contention that the trial court gave inadequate 
weight to his rehabilitative potential and his good character 
relies largely on language taken from State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 
930 (Utah 1998). See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 1 67 (relying 
similarly on Galli). There, in a split decision reversing the 
trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences, the Court 
observed that two trial courts "may not have given adequate 
weight to certain mitigating circumstances." Galli, 967 P.2d at 
938. The Court then cited, as mitigating circumstances, the 
facts that defendant used only a pellet gun in committing his 
crime, did not injure anyone, and took only a small amount of 
money. Id. It also found persuasive defendant's minimal 
criminal history and his exemplary behavior as a productive 
member of society during the years he lived outside the state, 
eluding detection. Id. 
In contrast, defendant in this case wielded a loaded 
handgun, shot one officer in the face, tried to shoot a second 
officer, and stole a costly vehicle as well as additional small 
items. Defendant here first became involved with the criminal 
justice system at age i m and, with the exception of a single 
year, had been arrested at least once - and usually more than 
once - every year, up to the date of the present crime, for 
significant criminal conduct. See PSR at 7-10. Defendant also 
-9-
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exhibited serious drug dependency and endangered the community 
through his drug use, his driving, and his continuing pattern of 
criminal conduct. Id. And, wholly unlike the facts in Galli, 
defendant's criminal behavior demonstrates a clear pattern of 
escalation, culminating in the attempted murder of a police 
officer. Because Galli presents an entirely unrelated and far 
less egregious constellation of facts, defendant's reliance on 
that case is misplaced. 
Moreover, in addition to the compelling facts of this case, 
the trial court had before it the written recommendation of Adult 
Probation and "Parole. The presentence investigator, after 
articulating mitigating factors, including his character and 
desire for rehabilitation, and aggravating factors, unequivocally 
concludes: "[I]t is the opinion of this department [that] 
consecutive sentences are demanded." PSR at 17. Under such 
circumstances, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 887. Consequently, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 
-10-
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
7^ RESPECTFULLY submitted this Q_ day of August, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Catherine E. Lilly, attorney for appellant, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this Q±_ day of August, 2002. 
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